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Recognition in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Şule Özler*
AbstrAct
There is an important role for recognition in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. There 
is recognition in the sympathetic process, in love and wealth accumulation. Because 
the sympathetic process is intersubjective as in the psychoanalytic literature, it is 
based on recognition of minds, which results from the mirroring process of mothers. 
Love, which is based on mutual regard, requires mutual recognition. Individuals are 
motivated with the need to form relationships, in which they recognize each other, as 
in the psychoanalytic literature on object relations theory, and philosophical writings. 
The third form of recognition is based on wealth accumulation, which gives esteem 
and admiration. Esteem results from recognition and is born out of interpersonal 
interactions. We contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of 
recognition in the sympathetic process, in love and wealth accumulation based on 
psychoanalytic and philosophical literature. 
Keywords: Recognition, sympathy, love, achievement, Adam Smith.
Reconocimiento en The Theory of Moral Sentiments de Adam Smith
resumen
Hay un papel importante para el reconocimiento en The Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
Se trata del reconocimiento en el proceso de simpatía, en el amor y la acumulación de 
riqueza. El proceso de simpatía se basa en el reconocimiento de las mentes, que resulta 
del proceso de reflejo de las madres en la infancia y es intersubjetivo en la literatura 
psicoanalítica. El amor, basado en el respeto mutuo, requiere reconocimiento mutuo. 
Los individuos están motivados con la necesidad de formar relaciones, en las que 
se reconocen mutuamente, como en la literatura psicoanalítica sobre la teoría de 
las relaciones objetales y las escrituras filosóficas. La forma de reconocimiento en 
la acumulación de riqueza se basa en que otorga estima y admiración. La estima 
es el resultado del reconocimiento y nace de las interacciones interpersonales. 
Contribuimos a la literatura destacando la importancia del reconocimiento en el 
proceso de simpatía, en el amor y la acumulación de riqueza que se presenta en la 
literatura psicoanalítica y filosófica.
PAlAbrAs clAve: Reconocimiento, simpatía, amor, logro, Adam Smith.
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Recognition plays an important role in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter TMS). We identified distinct forms of 
recognition in the TMS, which we elaborate on below. These different 
forms of recognition are based on the psychoanalytic and philosophical 
literatures. The first form, which occurs in the sympathetic process, is 
recognition of the mind of the other as in the intersubjective process 
described in the psychoanalytic literature. The second is mutual 
recognition that takes place in love relationships, as described by 
Hegel and the German philosopher Axel Honneth. The third type of 
recognition, based on Honneth, is recognition of the achievements of 
another that contribute to a shared value horizon of society, such as the 
value of wealth accumulation. 
First, let us define the mind, subjectivity, and the self, since we 
will be using these terms throughout the paper. Even though the 
recognition of the mind is referred to in the psychoanalytic literature 
on intersubjectivity, it is not defined in that literature. In general, in 
the psychoanalytic literature, the mind is viewed as a psychological 
structure; it includes memory, thought, language, values, morality, 
capacity to imagine, create, consciousness and so forth. Subjectivity 
refers to intensity of attachment, our agency, consciousness of 
experiences, beliefs, desires, and feelings; it is an essential part of being 
and it is fluid, rather than structured. It is about one’s knowledge of 
his unique self. The self is an ongoing accumulation of introjects that 
come from early object attachments. The self includes both the mind 
and subjectivity.
Starting with the sympathetic process, we should note that the 
sympathetic process which occurs between the spectator and the agent 
is an intersubjective one (Brown 2012, Özler and Gabrinetti 2018). In 
the psychoanalytic literature, one of the features of intersubjectivity 
is identified as recognition of the other’s mind (Ogden 1985; Stern 
1985; Benjamin 1988 y 1990; Stern et al. 1998). Another aspect of 
intersubjectivity is the creation of our subjectivities in the intersubjective 
process (Ogden 1992; Benjamin 1990). 
Since one type of recognition refers to the recognition of the mind 
of another, we ask how we come understand or, recognize our minds 
and those of others. In the psychoanalytic literature, Winnicott (1971) 
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states that there is no such thing as a baby. In other words, a baby only 
exists with his mother. An important element that can be provided by 
a mother is mirroring, which is when the mother reflects a reasonably 
accurate perspective in her experience of the child’s emotional state of 
being, back to the child. Mirroring serves the function of developing 
our subjectivities and helps babies to become aware of their state of 
minds. The child needs to find his mind in the mind of another to 
have awareness of his own mind, which occurs through mirroring. 
Caregivers instinctively “mark” their mirroring by using exaggerated 
facial and vocal patterns of affective, expressive displays. This is done 
to signal to the baby that it is the mother’s version of the baby’s state to 
indicate that this is not how she feels, but that she is aware of the baby’s 
state. Mentalization (an individual’s explicit and implicit interpretation 
of his and other’s actions) by the mother’s affective, interpersonal 
understanding of the child’s state facilitates the child’s capacity to 
mentalize. The child can explore the mind of the mother and learn 
about minds through this process. Children only become independent 
subjects if they are recognized as independent subjects having their 
own minds, and they in turn recognize the independent subjectivity of 
their mothers.
In the sympathetic process, self is constituted by being recognized 
by others. In the quote we give in the sympathy section, Smith states that 
one becomes aware of himself only when he is in society. Society is the 
mirror of an individual. In addition, the spectator and the agent recognize 
each other’s minds through an imagination process. Smith refers to 
one putting oneself in another’s situation through imagination. One’s 
situation entails his entire being, not only the external circumstances. 
Let us now turn to recognition in love. Honneth (1995) distinguishes 
three forms of recognition: love, rights and esteem. Of these, the first 
and the last are relevant for our project. Honneth starts with Hegel’s 
view of love. Love is a relationship of mutual recognition, in which 
individuality is confirmed. Honneth adds to this view by describing love 
as a precarious balance between attachment and independence. This 
echoes the psychoanalytic object relations theory, which suggests that 
individuals are motivated with the need to form relationships, in which 
they recognize each other. According to Honneth, in the object relations 
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theory, love is portrayed as a form of recognition because the theory 
indicates that the successful affectional bonds depends on our capacity 
to strike a balance between symbiosis and independence, a capacity 
that is acquired in early childhood. Honneth focuses on Winnicott 
(1965; 1971) to describe the object relations theory, as we will describe 
later. Smith did not have the language of object relations theory and 
recognition, having written about a century before Hegel, and about 
three centuries before Honneth and Winnicott. However, he puts great 
emphasis on love in the TMS and there is clear evidence that he views 
love as being a component of mutual regard. We can’t have mutual 
regard without recognizing the other.
The third form of recognition we identified in the TMS is based on 
wealth accumulation, which gives esteem, according to Honneth. Esteem 
comes as the result of recognition and is born out of the interpersonal 
interaction. With individualization, esteem is accompanied by a felt 
confidence that one’s abilities or achievements will be recognized as 
valuable by others. For this to occur an individual must do something 
that is valued by shared value horizon of a society. Wealth accumulation 
was an important component of the social value horizon in Scotland 
during Smith’s time. Per Smith, we admire and value those who 
accumulate wealth. We show our wealth to gain the approbation and 
the recognition of others. 
Our paper is not the only one that points out the importance 
of recognition in Smith’s works. Kalyvas and Katznelson (2001) 
emphasize the role of speech in linking sympathy, and markets. O’Neill 
(2011) focuses on pathologies of misrecognition, namely in poverty, 
arguing that the poor are misrecognized in Smith. The contribution 
of this paper is to highlight the importance of recognition in love, 
wealth accumulation, and the sympathetic process, benefitting from the 
psychoanalytic literature and Honneth’s writings. 
After this introduction, the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 
contains a review of recognition in the psychoanalytic literature. In 
section 3, we delineate recognition aspects of the sympathetic process 
in the TMS. Section 4 contains a description of recognition in Honneth, 
focusing on his conception of love and esteem. In section 5 we describe 
the preeminence of love in the TMS and posit it in terms of recognition. 
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Section 6 is an analysis of Smith’s views on wealth from a recognition 
perspective. Our concluding remarks are in Section 7. 
2. Recognition in psychoanalysis
Since we argue that the sympathetic process, and thereby morality is 
based on the recognition of the mind of another, in this section we 
describe how we come to recognize the mind of another. 
First, let us note that the sympathetic process is intersubjective, 
and it involves the recognition of the mind of another, as stated in the 
psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity. Kohut’s self-psychological 
approach was a precursor of intersubjective approach in psychoanalysis. 
He brought in the role of the analyst’s subjectivity to the treatment 
situation in relation to the patient’s subjectivity.1 In his use of empathy, 
Kohut (1971; 1977) highlights the analyst’s impact on the analytic 
situation. In this view, the analyst becomes an interactive participant 
in the analytic situation.2 The interactive analytic situation is impacted 
by the analyst. As such, the observer is included in the field that is 
observed, as occurs in the sympathetic process.3 
Different psychoanalysts emphasize different aspects of intersub-
jectivity. 1) Storolow and his collaborators (Stolorow and Atwood 1979; 
Storolow, Atwood and Brandchaft 1994) view intersubjectivity as mutual 
influence and regulation which starts at birth. 2) Mutual recognition of 
minds as separate, which develops later in infancy is the focus of Stern 
(1985; Stern et al. 1998) Ogden (1992a; 1992b) and Benjamin (1988; 
1990). 3) Stern (1985) and Ogden (1992a; 1992b) highlight the creation 
of shared meaning in the intersubjective process. This creation is an 
achievement of a later development in infancy. 
In this paper, we will only focus on the recognition aspect of 
intersubjectivity. In addition, only if the subject is recognized by another 
1 See Teicholz (2001) and Bohleber (2013) for useful reviews of intersubjectivity in psychoanalytic 
literature. 
2 The same view can be found in Loewald (1988: 50-51): “The origin of individual psychic life…is a 
transindividual field, represented by the mother/infant matrix, not an individual unconscious and 
instincts residing in an individual”. Similarly, each participant affects the other’s experience in a 
patient-analyst system of mutual interaction (Hoffman 1983). 
3 Similarly, Jung (1968: 41-42) states that “in psychology, the means by which you study the psyche 
is not the psyche itself…The observer is the observed”. 
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subject, does the subject exit. Because without recognition by another, 
one’s autonomy, one’s subjectivity, one’s self-consciousness does not form. 
Hegel (1807: 111) describes intersubjectivity as follows: “self-consciousness 
[Hegel’s term for independent subjectivity] exists in and for itself when, 
and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being 
acknowledged”. Benjamin (1990: 39) writes: “The need for recognition 
involves this fundamental paradox: In the very moment of realizing our 
independent will, we are dependent on others to recognize it”.
How do we develop the capacity to recognize our minds, our 
emotional states? From a psychoanalytic perspective, Winnicott (1971) 
posits that normal development in infancy and childhood takes place 
within a dyad in which two subjectivities meet (caregiver and the 
infant). According to Winnicott, there is no such thing as a baby alone, 
meaning that a baby exists in relation to its mother. The baby needs 
“good enough mothering.”4 An important function of the mother is 
mirroring (Winnicott 1971). Mirroring is the process during which 
the original caregiver “mirrors” back, or reflects back, to the child a 
reasonably accurate perspective in their experience of the child’s 
personal or emotional state of being at a given moment (“You seem 
happy today” “It looks like you are upset with me” “It seems that might 
be difficult for you”). Mirroring is the process that facilitates attunement 
to the child by reflecting the child’s inner state. As time and maturation 
move on, adults in close interactions provide the same sort of mirroring 
of these, and more complex, interactions for each other. The mirroring 
process between two people affirms their mutual experiences of each 
other and is often accompanied by a felt sense of being seen and valued. 
Over a lifetime, these interactions cumulatively begin to define an 
experienced sense of “self.” Mirroring serves the function of developing 
our subjectivities. Winnicott states: 
What does a baby see when he or she looks at the mother’s face? I am 
suggesting that, ordinarily, what the baby sees is himself or herself. 
In other words, the mother is looking at the baby and what she looks 
like is related to what she sees there. (Winnicott 1971: 151) 
4 According to Winnicott (1971), “The good-enough enough ‘mother’…is one who makes active 
adaptation to the infant’s needs, an active adaptation that gradually lessens, according to the 
infant’s growing ability to account for failure of adaptation and to tolerate the results of frustration” 
(Winnicott 1971: 13-14).
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He goes on to say that “When I look I am seen, so I exist” 
(Winnicott 1971: 154). Caregivers, instinctively, mark (exaggerate) their 
affect-mirroring by using facial and vocal pattern of affect expressive 
displays (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target, 2004). A mother does this 
to signal to the child that it is her version of his response to indicate that 
this is not how she feels, not her realistic response, but her awareness of 
the baby’s state, and that it is her reflection of the infant’s affect:5 
The infant recognizes and uses this marked quality to ‘decouple’ or 
to differentiate the perceived emotion from its referent (parent) and 
to ‘anchor’ or ‘own’ the marked mirroring stimulus as expressing his 
or her own self-state. (Aron 2006: 358)
When a child does not find his mind in the mind of the mother, 
he is left without an awareness of his own mind and without an 
authentic, personalized and vitalized sense of self, creating disorders.6 
How do we come to mentalize, to understand mental states of 
ourselves and of others? Mentalization was coined by Fonagy and 
colleagues (Fonagy et al. 2004) and has become a central concept in 
understanding development. It describes an individual’s explicit and 
implicit interpretation of his and other’s actions. This interpretation is 
done based on intentional mental states such as personal needs, desires, 
feelings, reasons and beliefs (Fonagy and Target 1996). It focuses on 
the affective interpersonal understanding of oneself and others, which 
helps one to develop a stable sense of self and enables a child to “read” 
other people’s minds. The contingent and marked mirroring of a child’s 
internal states facilitates the capacity to mentalize.7 The child’s general 
5 A) The baby may be overwhelmed if an expression lacks markedness and matches the baby’s state. 
The baby would feel it to be the parent’s real emotion. It would make the baby’s experience seem 
contagious, and even more dangerous. Instead of an experience of self, parental preoccupations 
that are experienced as unmetabolized alien introjects will reside, and the child is left without a 
sense of himself as a person in his own right. He will be prone to breakdowns of functioning, 
for example, regarding autonomy, separation, self-regulation, management of anger. B) If the 
mother’s expressions have markedness but don’t actually mirror the baby’s self-states, he will 
internalize representation of a mismatched state as a part of himself. In cases where this is the 
usual experience, self-representations of the baby will have a precarious tie to the underlying 
emotional states, and his self will be empty. His whole emotional reality may feel like a pretense. C) 
If mirroring fails because it is unmarked or inaccurate or both, the baby is not able to find himself 
in the other and as a result is unable to achieve and understanding of his self-state or achieve 
control. This leads to incongruence and disorganization within the self, an alien-self will emerge.
6 See previous endnote. 
7 Early understanding of mental states occurs in two modes (Fonagy and Target 1996). Psychic 
equivalence equates the internal world with the external. In the pretend mode, the child’s mental 
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understanding of minds through the mediation of secure attachment 
is facilitated by the parents’ capacity to observe the child’s mind.8 The 
child can explore the mind of the caregiver and learn about minds in the 
context of secure attachment. 
Fonagy and most developmental psychologists and psychoanalysts 
propose that the capacity for mentalizing develops with maturation. 
In their insightful study, Fonagy et al. (2004) observed that children’s 
understanding of mental states begins at about the age of three or four 
and mentalizing is embedded in the child’s social world (see the same 
study for other approaches). The child needs repeated experience of 
three things to create a fully mentalized psychic reality: his current 
mental states, having these states represented in the object’s (the 
caregiver’s) mind, and the frame represented by the caregiver’s normally 
external reality. Frame (“playing along,” such as pretending a banana is 
a telephone) is essential, meaning:
The child needs an adult or older child who will ‘play along’, so that 
the child can see his fantasy or idea represented in the adult’s mind, 
reintroject this, and use it as a representation of his own thinking. 
(Fonagy et al. 2004: 266)
The child perceives his feelings and thoughts in the parent’s 
mind: “Linking his internal state to a perception of that state outside 
offers a representation-a symbol- of the internal state: it corresponds 
to, yet it is not equivalent, to the state” (Fonagy et al. 2004: 266-67). 
The child is able to equate the real and the apparent and clarify the 
distinction between pretend and serious mode, when the omnipotent 
and omniscient parent playfully pretends. He can then know about his 
wish or idea and experience it. The child can see the parent adopting 
an as-if attitude to his intentional stance due to the parent’s entry into 
the child’s world in a playful way. This is an elaboration of mirroring 
by the parent. 
Children become independent subjects only if they are recognized 
as such by their caregivers, which facilitates their having their own 
state is separated from the external mode, and the internal state is viewed as having no implications 
for the external world. To arrive at mentalization, the child integrates these two modes. Inner and 
outer realities are seen as separate but linked. 
8 Children with secure attachments show some distress when the parents leave, but they compose 
themselves when the parents return. They feel protected. Adults with secure attachment have a 
positive view of themselves, others and relationships. 
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will, mind, and feelings, (Winnicott 1971; Benjamin 1990; Fonagy 
at al. 2004;). This notion is currently commonplace. Furthermore, a 
child becomes an independent subject only if he in turn recognizes the 
independent subjectivity of his caregiver. 
Ogden (2004) conceptualizes intersubjectivity as dialectical and 
emphasizes the interdependence of subject and object, as opposed to 
viewing the analyst and the analyzed as separate subjects. The foundation 
of individual subjectivity is an intersubjective dialectic of being recognized 
and recognizing. When there is a failure, the dialectic tension collapses, 
each leaves the other alone; there is no participation in an interpersonal 
process in which each gives back to the other. In contrast:
When the object becomes a subject, the recognition of oneself by 
the Other creates the conditions for a new way of being aware of 
one’s own subjectivity, and subjectivity itself thereby altered. In 
other words, the experience of the recognition of one’s own ‘I-ness’ 
by an Other (who is recognized as an experiencing ‘I’) creates an 
intersubjective dialectic through which one becomes aware of one’s 
own subjectivity in a new way, i.e. one becomes ‘self-conscious’ in 
a way that the individual had not previously experienced. (Ogden 
1992b: 662) 
According to Stern (1985), intersubjectivity is about recognition 
of the mind of the self and the other, which starts emerging towards 
the end of age one. In this approach, an infant can recognize the 
separateness of mind in self and other, only after the subjective self 
has been established. The ability for this recognition requires prior 
development along linguistic, relational, cognitive, and affective paths 
as well as mutual regulations between the infant and primary care 
takers. According to Stern, there is a core or physical sense of self 
that occurs before a subjective sense of self develops and long before 
the infant can recognize his mind and the other’s mind. Even though 
the infant can make distinctions between actions that result from the 
other’s body and his own body, he does not yet recognize intentionality, 
or the presence of minds. The capacity for recognition requires that the 
primary caretakers regulate the infant well enough over time. Through 
this regulation, some sense of predictability is established about what 
might emerge from the other and from the infant. As a result, between 
the ages of seven and nine months old, the subjective self emerges 
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which is built upon the core self. The infant’s simultaneous recognition 
that the other has a separate, unique and a parallel inner life is tied 
to the development of the subjective self. Stern calls this recognition 
intersubjective relatedness. The acquisition of language also makes it 
possible to have shared meaning: “the acquisition of language is potent 
in the service of union and togetherness. In fact, every word learned 
is the by-product of uniting two mentalities in a common symbol 
system, a forging of shared meaning” (Stern 1985: 172). In referring to 
intersubjectivity, Benjamin (1990) states:
Intersubjective theory postulates that the other must be recognized 
as another subject in order for the self to fully experience his or her 
subjectivity in the other’s presence. This means that we have a need for 
recognition and that we have a capacity to recognize others in return, 
thus making mutual recognition possible. (Benjamin 1990: 35)
She also states that Hegel claims, ‘in trying to establish itself as 
an independent entity, the self must… recognize the other as a subject 
like itself in order to be recognized by the other” (Benjamin 1990: 36). 
Benjamin (1988) defines intersubjectivity as mutual recognition, which 
occurs later in infancy. Recognition is possible only if we concurrently 
and first recognize the other and the other must recognize us. Otherwise, 
the recognition that we have will be worthless. Recognition is part 
of human development. She introduces the notion of intersubjective 
mental space co-created by both subjects, which she calls the “third.” 
There is an affirmation that human beings are linked by a third in the 
reciprocal affirmation of the other. This “third” allows the suffering of 
other humans to matter, independent of their origins or status, because 
it is contained in the experience of the third. It means being able to 
perceive things from the other’s perspective. The possibility of mutual 
recognition and mental space for thought is due to the shared third. 
Two people have a common third. They surrender to the third and have 
dialogical relationship. Then, they may reflect on their interactions. 
When she talks about this form of moral thirds, she states that it is 
based on the essence of intersubjectivity itself and it is a consequence 
of mutual recognition. 
Sandler (1995) refers to recognition as the “moment of meeting.” 
In that moment, one’s self-gestalt meets and matches the way one was 
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known by another. Winnicott (1971) describes a similar interactive 
process between a therapist and a child. They alternate in making 
drawings, which Winnicott calls “squiggles.” Each embellishes the 
drawings of the other. This brings them both to a shared awareness. 
In this process, “the child becomes aware that another is aware of 
what the child is aware of within” (Sandler 1995: 589). Winnicott calls 
this a “sacred moment.” Through the reoccurrence of these moments 
one comes to know oneself as one is known through the other. Kohut 
rarely uses the concept of recognition. However, he highlights the 
developmental process of mirroring (Kohut 1971: 1977). 
3. Sympathy, intersubjectivity and recognition 
The sympathetic process is an intersubjective one between a spectator 
and an agent, as such in the sympathetic process in which there are 
two subjectivities involved. By definition, the presence of two subjec-
tivities creates an intersubjective field, which entails recognition. Any 
human interaction, whether it is between infant and mother, between 
adults, or in the market place, opens the possibility for recognition to 
take place. When there is a failure in caregiving and the infant is not 
recognized, various forms of pathologies emerge,9 when there is no 
recognition of the other’s needs, willingness in the market place trade 
does not occur, and when there is no recognition, there is no identity 
formation and consensual morality. For consensual morality to emer-
ge, there needs to be a recognition of the actor by the spectator and 
the spectator by the actor. Otherwise, there would not be any room to 
reach a consensus.
First, it is important to note that in the TMS there is a clear sense 
that our selves are constituted through recognition. Smith views society 
as a mirror which enables us to know who we are. Without a mirror 
a human being would not be aware of his behavior, character or his 
deformity because he does not have the society as a mirror. Yet, when he 
9 For example, when the mother is not “good enough” she repeatedly fails to comprehend the 
infant through the infant’s gestures, and substitutes her own gestures, which is given sense by the 
compliance of the infant. The true self, which is a sense of self based on spontaneous authentic 
experience, is defensively replaced by a false self by the baby. In the extreme cases, false-self 
hides the true self to the point that “spontaneity is not feature in the infant’s living experiences” 
(Winnicott 1965: 147).
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comes into the society, he has the society as a mirror, which allows him 
to see the propriety or impropriety of his behavior, and his deformities 
and beauties. In Smith’s words:
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood 
in some solitary place, without any communication with his own 
species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety 
or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or 
deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his 
own face. All these are objects which he cannot easily see, which 
naturally he does not look at, and with regard to which he is provided 
with no mirror which can present them to his view. Bring him into 
society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror which he 
wanted before. It is placed in the countenance and behavior of those 
he lives with, which always mark when they enter into, and when 
they disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here that he first views 
the propriety and impropriety of his own passions, the beauty and 
deformity of his own mind. (1759: 129)
This quotation speaks to the formation of subjectivity through 
recognition. In addition to not knowing who he is, if a man were a 
stranger to society from birth, he would not have a moral sense:
Bring him into society, and all his own passions will immediately 
become the causes of new passions. He will observe that mankind 
approves of some of them, and are disgusted by others. (Smith 
1759:129)
A spectator is not an actual bystander but is a creation of the agent’s 
imagination, though the imagined spectator owes its existence to real 
spectators that have been experienced throughout life. The impartiality 
of spectators is crucial. The spectators achieve impartiality by imagining 
that they are being spectated by other spectators. According to Smith, 
we are each other’s spectators, who mitigate our self-interest when we 
imagine that other spectators observe us at a distance. Even when the 
spectator is internalized, there is a recognition of the spectator’s separate 
place in our mind as there is in our recognition of our superego.10 
The spectator, through an imaginative process, puts himself in the 
agent’s situation and forms an idea about how the agent is affected in a 
given situation, and “an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought 
10 It has been argued that the impartial spectator is a pre-cursor of the superego Raphael 2007, 
Ozler and Gabrinetti 2018.
77Recognition in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments
of his situation” (Smith 1759: 13), though the spectator might have the 
experience in a weaker degree.11 In this process, in order to be able to 
put himself into the agent’s situation, the spectator must be able to 
recognize the agent as a separate being. 
The spectator compares his own feelings to the feelings he 
imagines the agent has. Sympathy is a concordance between the actual 
feelings of the agent and the imagined feelings of the actor by the 
spectator, and it gives pleasure. The spectator can sympathize with 
the feelings, motives and actions of the agent.12 Mutual sympathy is 
a foundational element of Smith’s moral structure. Within Smith’s 
structure, sympathy is pleasurable and mutual sympathy engenders 
pleasure through sympathetic feelings. Mutual sympathy is also a 
source of satisfaction, and not being able to sympathize is disagreeable. 
This process bears a strong resemblance to the mirroring process in 
the modern psychoanalytic literature. While Smith was not aware that 
he was speaking of a larger psychological process, we conclude that 
Smith’s depiction embodies this recognized psychological process from 
modern psychoanalysis and developmental psychology.
If there is not a concordance of sentiments reached by both the actor 
and the spectator, they work together to achieve it. This is motivated by 
Smith’s assertion that there is a desire for mutual sympathy. The spectator 
works hard at putting himself in the agent’s position and by paying 
attention to every detail, and in so doing must undertake their imaginary 
change of situation as well as possible. If he does not initially sympathize 
he works at ironing out differences. The spectator attempts to change his 
perspective and feelings because he desires mutual sympathy.13 During 
this process, the spectator recognizes the agent’s mind.
The agent desires a more complete sympathy and works hard to 
gain it. Griswold (1999) gives the following reasons for this increased 
11 Freud (1930: 89) makes an analogous statement. “We shall always consider other people’s 
distress objectively- that is to place ourselves, with our own wants and sensibilities, in their 
conditions, and then to examine what occasions we should find in them for experiencing happiness 
or unhappiness”.
12 Through the use of imagination, sympathy engenders both cognitive and emotional experiences 
between the spectator and agent. It has a cognitive dimension in that the formation of any idea 
in the agent’s experience is an intellectual undertaking. At the same time sympathy also has an 
emotional dimension because we feel at least similar to what the agent feels. 
13 Brodie (2006) likens this effort on the part of the spectator to “critique” and “improvement.” 
He states that these two basic concepts of the Enlightenment underly Smith’s description of the 
spectator.
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effort. The agent has more invested in the situation, thus he has more at 
stake than the spectator. While the spectator’s emotions are imaginary, 
the actor’s emotions are related to the real situation. The agent also 
wants to avoid the pain of solitude: “The horror of solitude drives him 
back into society” (Smith 1759: 99). An additional factor motivating the 
agent for concordance of sentiments is his yearning for approbation. 
Towards this end the agent adjusts his passions. He does this under 
the critical eye of the spectator. In this process, the agent recognizes the 
mind of the spectator through imagination. It is only by recognizing the 
mind of the spectator he can know how to adjust his passions.
Sympathy is spectatorial in an interdependent relationship. It is 
through the sympathetic process that emotions are communicated 
and understood. The agent and the spectator continually exchange 
information about their judgment of other people’s sentiments and 
their own sentiments. Sympathetic process guides judgment, and it is 
a dynamic process. In the larger context of human culture, we are all 
spectators and actors working together to form a consensual morality. 
Sympathy is not “automatic, passive and mindless” because both the 
actor and the spectator work hard to reach a concordance of sentiments 
through the sympathetic process (Radner 1980). 
By observing others and having experiences, we form general rules, 
and from these general rules we learn what is approved or disapproved 
of. By using the general rules, we correct “the misrepresentations of 
self-love concerning what is fit and proper to be done in our particular 
situation” (Smith 1759: 186). It is the regard to the general rules or 
its disregard which distinguishes a worthless fellow from an honorable 
man., morality is founded upon general rules. Smith likens the general 
rules to the laws of the Deity “promulgated by those vicegerents which 
he has thus set up within us” (1759: 192). The vicegerents punish the 
violations of the general laws by self-condemnation and shame. 
Sympathy is a social practice in which ordinary people encounter one 
another. Moral life is a social practice. Sympathy has a socializing feature, 
as well as a character-constituting feature.14 As in the psychoanalytic 
literature reviewed above, in the sympathetic process, a new awareness 
of one’s own subjectivity which is constituted intersubjectively develops. 
14 “…sympathy in Adam Smith’s sense is a socializing agent” (Raphael1985: 31). 
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Sympathy socializes both the agent and the spectator, since the first 
would like to be the object of sympathy and the second would like to 
sympathize. Moral exchanges, therefore, create sociality and establish a 
general consensus about what is morally approved.
Smith’s sympathy is an intersubjective one. First, as in the 
psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity, in the sympathetic process 
there are two subjectivities involved. As in Stolorow and Atwood (1979), 
Kohut (1982) and Storolow, Atwood and Brandchaft (1994) in the 
dynamic interaction between the spectator and the agent whilst they are 
adjusting their sentiments there is mutual influence. Second, the agent 
and the spectator have a mutual recognition by putting themselves 
in each other’s position as in (Stern 1985; Ogden 1994). There is a 
dialectical interplay between the agent and the spectator. Recognition is 
possible when the other recognizes us, and we recognize them. Third, 
morality that is created through the concordance of sentiments in the 
sympathetic process allows for the creation of a shared meaning as in 
Stern (1985) and Ogden (1992).
Focusing on recognition, through the dynamic interaction 
between the spectator and the agent, recognition is achieved by placing 
themselves in each other’s situations through imagination. The 
spectator imagines what the agent would be feeling; the agent imagines 
how the spectator would be responding. In this process, there is the first 
and necessary recognition that they have separate minds.15 This is the 
same process that is elucidated in Stern (1985), Ogden (1994; 2004) 
and Stern et al. (1998). There is also a mutual recognition, as in Stern 
(1985), Stern et al. (1998) and Benjamin (1998; 2004; 2011) of the other 
in this process and the potential for reciprocal affirmation (Benjamin 
1998; 2004; 2011). Through this process, the agent and the spectator 
come to recognize their intersubjective relatedness as we see in Stern 
(1985) and Stern et al. (1998).
It is also important to point out that sympathetic process operates 
in the markets and as such, markets are also sites of recognition, which 
is a topic for future research. Both in markets and in the sympathetic 
15 In his Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel (1807: 229) states that, “Self-consciousness exists in itself 
and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it 
is only by being acknowledged or recognized”. Self-knowledge, including one’s sense of freedom 
and sense of self, is understanding ourselves as an independent self-consciousness requires the 
recognition of another. 
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process, individuals interact with each other. This interaction is based 
on mutual recognition. In the marketplace, each trader is a spectator of 
other traders. The mutual exchange of information takes place between 
them. In the sympathetic process, the information that is exchanged are 
sentiments, while in the marketplace, the information exchanged is the 
prices that the traders are willing to trade at. In the marketplace, traders 
recognize each other and influence each other to agree on a price that is 
approved of by the impartial spectator. The agents work hard to achieve 
consensual prices. The prices that are traded at are the shared meaning. 
4. Recognition in Honneth
In addition to the important inclusion of recognition in the sym-
pathetic process, there are two other aspects of Smith’s works that 
are relevant for recognition: love and wealth accumulation. In order 
to elucidate these two aspects of recognition, we will briefly review 
Honneth’s approach to recognition.
First, let us make a few brief remarks about recognition in 
philosophy. Recognition is an important way of respecting and valuing 
another person, and it is fundamental to understanding ourselves. 
It also requires that the person who is being recognized judges the 
recognizer as capable of conferring recognition. In practical philosophy, 
the concept of recognition has played a central role. The person who 
acted in estimable ways could lead a good life in the ethics of classical 
antiquity. In the Scottish Enlightenment, desirable virtues were acquired 
by public recognition or disapproval. According to Kant, the concept of 
respect meant treating everyone as an end in himself. It is not until 
Hegel (1807) that the concept of recognition did become a cornerstone of 
ethics. Since about late 1970s, the idea that there needs to be recognition 
of the differences between individuals or groups as emerged, notably 
in feminist ethics (Taylor 1992). The concept is used to refer to caring 
and loving concern between the mother and the child in the feminist 
literature (Hirschman 1989). Habermas (1990) and Wingert (1993) use 
it to refer to the mutual respect for the equality and particularity of others. 
Finally, recognition is also used in reference to how societal solidarity 
emerges through the esteem of unfamiliar modes of life (Taylor 1992).
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Honneth (1995) distinguishes three forms of recognition: love, 
which gives self-confidence, rights, which give self-respect, and 
solidarity which gives self-esteem. Of these, love and esteem are the 
ones that are relevant for our analysis of Smith’s works. Below we fist 
review Honneth’s views on love, to be followed by a review of esteem.
4.1. Love
Love here does not only refer to intimate sexual relationship but to any 
primary relationships where there are strong emotional attachments 
among people. This notion was originally referred to in the historical 
literature by Hegel (1807). Hegel’s view of love is that it is a relationship 
of mutual recognition, in which individuality is confirmed. Honneth 
(1995: 96) cites Hegel’s idea of love as “being oneself in another”, and 
describes Hegel’s view on love as follows:
Love represents the first stage of reciprocal recognition, because in 
it subjects mutually confirm each other with regard to the concre-
te nature of their needs and thereby recognize each other as needy 
creatures. In the reciprocal experience of loving, both subjects know 
themselves to be united in their neediness, in their dependence on 
each other. (Honneth 1995: 95)
Honneth argues that this view of love as a precarious balance 
between attachment and independence is the same as in the 
psychoanalytic object-relations theory. Good reviews of this literature 
can be found in Eagle (2011), and Fonagy and Target (2003). Object 
relations theory suggests that individuals are motivated with the need 
to form relationships. This is a deviation from Freud’s view that libido 
is motivated with sexual and aggressive drives.
Honneth argues that object relations theory portrays love as a form 
of recognition. The object relations theory indicates that the success of 
affectional bonds depends on our capacity to strike a balance between 
symbiosis and independence, a capacity acquired in early childhood. He 
particularly focuses on Winnicott (1965; 1971). According to Winnicott, 
at the beginning of every human life, there is symbiosis between the 
primary caregiver (we will use mother) and child, an undifferentiated 
intersubjectivity.16 In this stage mother (object) and child (subject) are 
16 Winnicott calls this stage as “absolute dependency” (1965). 
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completely dependent on each other to meet their needs and are not 
able to separate themselves from each other.17 This phase ends once 
each of them starts having a newfound independence, for example 
when the mother can again turn to her social field, and the child slowly 
becomes able to endure the mother’s absences. At the same as the child 
starts experiencing the mother as outside his omnipotent control, he 
also becomes aware of this dependence.18 In this stage, in order to work 
through this dependency, the child starts to become destructive. The 
destruction mechanism operates as follows: By becoming aggressive 
towards the mother, such as biting her, the child unconsciously tests 
whether the object belongs to reality.19 If the mother survives this, 
without taking revenge, without withdrawing her love, the “subject may 
now have started to live a life in the world of objects” (Winnicott 197: 
121). The mother becomes a being in her own right; the child integrates 
his aggressive impulses and starts being able to love her and accept his 
own dependence on the mother.20 If the mother’s love is lasting, the 
child develops a sense of “confidence” that his needs will be met, under 
the umbrella of the mother’s intersubjective reliability.21 
Honneth follows Benjamin (1988) and introduces Hegel’s concept 
of struggle for recognition in referring to the process described by 
Winnicott as a struggle. Honneth concludes that recognition that is found 
in love as described by Hegel, can be described as a communicative arc 
suspended between the experience of being merged and the experience 
of being able to be alone, not only as an intersubjective state. 
17 Due to the essential nature of “holding” during this phase, Winnicott refers to this as the “holding 
phase” (1965).
18 This new stage is labelled as “relative dependence” (Winnicott 1965). 
19 Winnicott (1971) describes this process as the child’s attempt to “destroy” the object.
20 Winnicott describes this process as “object usage” (Winnicott 1971). In addition, the child starts 
using “transitional” objects. With “transitional phenomena,” Winnicott is referring to the strong 
tendency of children to develop affectively charged relationships to objects in their environment, 
such as toys or a blanket. (Winnicott 1971). These act as surrogates for the mother, who has been 
lost to external reality. The child relates to these objects both affectionately and destructively. 
Transitional objects mediate between the awareness of separateness and the primary experience of 
being merged. The child symbolically attempts to bridge the painful gap between outer and inner 
reality. 
21 In addition, the child develops a basic “capacity to be alone” (Winnicott 1971).
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4.2. Esteem
This type of recognition requires an intersubjectively shared value 
horizon. Individuals are granted esteem, and social prestige, inter-
subjectively, based on the degree which they help to realize culturally 
defined values. In addition, individuals are recognized based on the 
socially defined worth of their characteristics, accomplishments and 
abilities:
Prestige or standing signifies only the degree of social recognition 
the individual earns for his or her form of self-realization by thus 
contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realization of so-
ciety’s abstractly defined goals. With regard to this…individualized 
system of recognition relations, everything now depends, therefore, 
on the definition of generalized value horizon, which is supposed 
to be open to various forms of self-realization and yet, at the same 
time, must also be able to serve as an overarching system of esteem. 
(Honneth 1995: 126)
The worth of an individual depends on the dominant interpretations 
of societal goals in each historical case. There is an ongoing cultural 
conflict, permanent struggle, because different groups attempt to 
publicly show that their accomplishments or ways of life are especially 
valuable. As long as recognition found in esteem is organized in terms 
of status groups, only the group itself is the addressee of esteem. 
Within the group, because the individual knows himself to be esteemed 
by all others to the same degree, interactions within the group has 
the character of solidarity. The reason is that subjects sympathize, 
mutually, with their different forms of life because among themselves 
they esteem each other symmetrically; everyone is “given the chance to 
experience oneself to be recognized” (Honneth 1995: 130). Solidarity 
generates an intersubjective value horizon in which individuals learn to 
recognize the trait and abilities of the others to the same degree. With 
individualization, social esteem is accompanied by a felt confidence that 
one’s abilities or achievements will be recognized as valuable by others. 
The individual no longer attributes the respect he receives to the group 
but refers them positively back to himself. It is possible to talk about 
societal solidarity to the extent that every member of a society is in a 
position to esteem himself. 
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5. Love and recognition in the TMS
Having written the TMS almost a century before Hegel, and about 
three centuries before Honneth and Winnicott wrote their seminal 
works, Smith did not have the vocabulary of intersubjectivity and re-
cognition to apply to love relationships. He could not have written 
about love in terms of intersubjectivity and recognition. However, 
Smith puts great emphasis on love in the TMS: “Love is an agreeable…
passion” (Smith 1759: 19). “The agreeable passions of love and joy can 
satisfy and support the heart without any auxiliary pleasure,” he writes 
(Smith 1759: 19). Making a strong statement about love, Smith states: 
“There is in love a strong mixture of humanity, generosity, kindness, 
friendship, esteem” (Smith 1759: 41). Smith wrote not only about love 
between two people, but also about love in society.
There is clear evidence in the TMS that love involves mutuality. 
People have a mutual regard for each other:
Their [people who love each other] mutual regard renders them 
happy in one another, and sympathy, with this mutual regard, 
makes them agreeable to every other person. With what pleasure 
do we look upon a family, through the whole of which reign mutual 
love and esteem, where the parents and children are companions 
for one another, without any other difference than what is made 
by respectful affection on the one side, and kind indulgence on the 
other. (Smith 1759: 48)
Even though Smith did not articulate it in terms of recognition, to 
have “mutual regard,” people who have love towards each other must 
mutually recognize each other. Smith states that the love of parents for 
their children is praise-worthy. Even when it is excessive, it is never 
odious. Excessive love might be hurtful for children, and a source of 
inconvenience to parents. However, “we easily pardon it, and never 
regard it with hatred and detestation” (Smith 1759: 64). 
Love is constructed as a mutual feeling. Smith’s view is that “I 
judge…your love by my love” (TMS: 20). Similarly, our love for our 
neighbor is the same thing as our neighbor’s love for us. In Smith’s view 
to the person who feels it, love is agreeable and delightful. Smith states 
that the love of a lover appears to others as “ridiculous.” At the same 
time, “its intentions are seldom mischievous” (1759: 41). According to 
Smith, even excessive love is something we sympathize with. 
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Society is happy when there is love:
Where the necessary assistance is reciprocally afforded from love, 
from gratitude, from friendship, and esteem, the society flourishes 
and is happy. All the different members of it are bound together by 
the agreeable bands of love and affection, and are, as it were, drawn 
to one common centre of mutual good offices. (Smith 1759: 100)
Smith states that a man desires to be lovely, not only to be loved. 
He wants to be the proper and natural object of love, he wants to be 
recognized in a love relationship. We are disposed to desire to be objects 
of love and admiration when we have love and admiration for others. 
Putting it in terms of recognition, we can say that it is only when we 
recognize others that we will also be recognized by them.
Men have a desire for praise-worthiness not only praise. There 
is a love of praise-worthiness. Men have a desire to be approved of. 
We love to be “honorable and noble, of the grandeur, and dignity, 
and superiority of our own characters” (Smith 1759: 158). However, 
“Humanity does not desire to be great, but to be beloved.” (Smith 1759: 
194). Smith discusses at length the importance of praiseworthiness, 
and being lovely, which every man desires from others. In other words, 
a man desires recognition. The love of praiseworthiness is the desire 
of rendering ourselves the proper objects of those sentiments [the 
favorable sentiments of our brethren] (Smith 1759: 147). We want to be 
praiseworthy, a desire that Nature endows us with. He states that:
The jurisdiction of the man without, is founded altogether in the 
desire of actual praise, and in the aversion to actual blame. The 
jurisdiction of the man within, is founded altogether in the desire of 
praise-worthiness… in the desire of possessing those qualities, and 
performing those actions, which we love and admire in other people. 
(Smith 1759: 150)
Smith also writes on friendship in the TMS. (Uyl and Griswold 
1996; Ozler and Gabrinetti 2018). He views that the impartial spectator 
would be pleased with friendship, even when it is expressed to those 
who are not connected to us. Even when these emotions are excessive, 
they are not regarded with aversion. Smith sees friendships as a 
basic human need. The harmony of friendship and the affections of 
friends are felt even by the “rudest vulgar man.” Because friends enter 
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our resentment and our joy, they are useful. Friendship is based on 
consensual validation. Smith sees friendship coming from a desire to be 
related and genuine love. Being excluded from friendship makes us feel 
excluded from “the best and most comfortable of all social enjoyments”. 
(Smith 1759: 286)
Smith also sees friendships as useful. We are more anxious to 
communicate our disagreeable passions such as resentment because 
we expect more indulgence from a friend than from a stranger. This 
utility, however is limited. In adversity we should go into the and seek 
society, not the sympathy of friends. Friends restore us to tranquility, 
which is an important component of happiness according to Smith. The 
good opinion and trust of friends relieves a man about any doubt he 
might have about himself. Smith seems to be idealizing friendships. 
Smith also views that the attachment we have for friends is based 
upon the love of virtue is the most virtuous, as well as being permanent 
and secure. Attachments based on our good behavior and conduct are 
most respectable. This can exist only among men of virtue. The necessity 
of mutual accommodation, among well-disposed people, produces a 
friendship that is like the ones found in families. 
Overall, Smith views love as an important source of human 
connectedness. It makes people happy and society is happy, and it 
flourishes. There is mutual regard in love. We want to be loved but 
being lovable is more important. 
6. Wealth and recognition in the TMS
Smith’s primary interest in his economics magnum opus, the Wealth 
of Nations, was in productivity increase, economic growth and increase 
of the wealth of nations. This desire was shared by other citizens 
during the Scottish Enlightenment. Scots were poor. There were 
intense debates about conditions that may lead to economic growth, 
and Smith was the key contributor in understanding the sources of 
wealth generation. 
Having wealth was an important component of the Scottish social 
value horizon. Smith describes this as follows. We want to have the 
admiration and respect of mankind, which is a highly desired object. 
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Studying wisdom and practicing virtue is one of the roads to have 
admiration. However, only a small group of people are steady admirers 
of virtuous people because:
The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers, and, 
what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the disinterested 
admirers and worshippers, of wealth and greatness. (Smith 1759: 73) 
Smith asks:
For to what purpose is all the toil and bustle of this world? what is the 
end of avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and 
preheminence? (1759: 61)
Smith’s answer to the above question is:
To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy, 
complacency, and approbation, are all the advantages which we can 
propose to derive from it. (1759: 61)
We show off our wealth because we want to be recognized, 
observed and have the approbation of others. What interests us is not 
the pleasure or the ease wealth would give us, but vanity. But vanity 
makes us believe that having wealth will make us have the “attention of 
the world” and approbation. 
It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with 
our joy than our sorrow, that we make a parade of our riches, and 
conceal our poverty. (Smith 1759: 60-61)
There is shame in poverty. The poor man “feels that it either places 
him out of the sight of mankind, or, that if they take any notice of him, 
they have, however, scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and 
distress which he suffers” (Smith 1759: 61). The poor man is afraid of 
being disapproved and overlooked. He is “mortified” with the thought 
of these inflictions. 
We show our wealth to be sympathized, because it is easier for 
others to sympathize with our joy rather than our sorrow. Smith states:
It is because mankind is disposed to sympathize more entirely with 
our joy than with our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, 
and conceal our poverty. Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to 
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expose our distress to the view of the public, and to feel, that though 
our situation is open to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives 
for us the half of what we suffer. Nay, it is chiefly from this regard to 
the sentiments of mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty. 
(1759: 60-61) 
This disposition of mankind to admire the rich and to at least 
neglect the poor is necessary for the establishment and maintenance 
of the distinction of ranks and order of society, though it might lead to 
a corruption of our moral sentiments. The world gives more attention 
to the rich:
Wisdom and virtue are by no means the sole objects of respect; 
nor vice and folly, of contempt. We frequently see the respectful 
attentions of the world more strongly directed towards the rich and 
the great, than towards the wise and the virtuous. (Smith 1759: 72)
It is not moral to say that wealth and greatness devoid of merit 
and virtue deserve respect. However, they are the natural objects of our 
respect.
Those exalted stations [wealth and greatness] may, no doubt, be 
completely degraded by vice and folly. But the vice and folly must be 
very great, before they can operate this complete degradation (Smith 
1759: 73-74). 
Wealth is not only a source of recognition, but also is a source of 
pleasure: 
The pleasures of wealth and greatness…view, strike the imagination 
as something grand and beautiful and noble, of which the attainment 
is well worth all the toil and anxiety which we are so apt to bestow 
upon it. (Smith 1759: 214)
We also believe that others will go along with our agreeable 
emotions that our situation makes us feel. 
At the thought of [ others going along with our emotions], his heart 
seems to swell and dilate itself within him, and he is fonder of 
his wealth, upon this account, than for all the other advantages it 
procures him. (Smith 1759: 61-62)
In the Wealth of Nations (herein WN), Smith states that “the desire 
of bettering our condition… comes with us from the womb, and never 
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leaves us till we go into the grave (Smith 1776: 341). The desire to better 
our condition leads to wealth accumulation, which gives us approbation 
and recognition. The drive of individuals for accumulation is explained 
by approval and recognition in an intersubjective context. 
7. Concluding remarks
We have argued that there is recognition in the sympathetic process, 
in love and wealth accumulation in the TMS, benefitting from psy-
choanalytic literature, and Honneth’s writings. 
The sympathetic process is intersubjective and as such, is based on 
recognition of minds. We clarified the meaning of recognition from a 
psychoanalytic perspective as a process, which results from the mirroring 
process of mothers. Recognition serves to develop our subjectivities. 
Recognition of other’s minds requires mentalization. This is the result of 
a mother’s ability to mentalize a child’s state of mind.
Love is an important component of the TMS. Smith views love as 
based on mutual regard, which requires mutual recognition. One way to 
conceptualize the presence of recognition in love is through Honneth’s 
writings, where he views that it is a capacity acquired in early childhood 
based on the object relations theory, especially Winnicott. 
Wealth accumulation, an important component of social value 
horizon during the Scottish Enlightenment, was shared by Smith as an 
equally important value. According to Smith, the reason we accumulate 
wealth is to have the admiration and recognition of others. 
In sum, having written a century before Hegel, and three centuries 
before Honneth and Winnicott, even though he did not have the 
language for it, in the TMS, Smith was writing about different forms 
of recognition. 
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